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Fiscal risk is what government must affront. But conventional analysis only concentrates on the 
revenue and expenditure, deficit and debt what is related to the fiscal circulation. In fact, 
Government’s Contingent Liability which is uncertain and uneasy to measure is of much more risk 
and breakage while it is often ignored. So, it’s important to analyze the reason and mechanism of 
the GCL. The main conclusions and contents of this dissertation include: 
1. There are many complicate reasons not only objective one such as the existence of public risk, 
but also subjective one such as the opportunism in fiscal adjustment why the GCL comes in China. 
Furthermore, the GCL is enslaved to the feebleness of internal fiscal ability and the constraint of 
external fiscal pressure, and the pay-as-you-go system in budget opens the door to the GCL which 
makes government carry through indirect financing by the implicit guarantees. Also, there is 
transition background to the GCL in China.  
2. Government implicit guarantees are the main carrier of the GCL. The economic transition 
course is actually the course which government changes fiscal direct financing to providing indirect 
implicit guarantees. In which, the central government has on its shoulders to discharge liability from 
enterprise, bank and local government which makes China a integrated implicit guarantee system 
with the central government core and the other parts object. 
3. There are many items and much scale of the GCL in China. It means nothing to discuss 
liability with liability to evaluate GCL risk, so we must relate the GCL to the fiscal ability or asset 
which discharges it. By the empirical analysis, we find the asset what commutes liability and 
disputes risk is relatively low, which results in the government asset-liability ratio high and CL risk 
serious. The decline of the fiscal drawing ability also cripples the government ability to offer public 
goods, depresses its macro-adjustment ability and lowers its ability to discharge liability. 
  4. It’s important to use international cases and correlated experiences for reference to control the 
GCL because it’s austere position in our country. The measures including the risk duty partition 
between the government and market, fiscal transparency and making implicit guarantee explicit, 
perfecting the designing and fathering mechanism of the government guarantees, carrying out 
accrual basis and asset-liability management etc. 
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析》，《经济研究》2001 年第 8 期，15－24 页。 
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第一章 导 论 
 - 3 -
图 1－1）。Kharas 和 Mishra 还揭示了隐性赤字主要来源于或有负债及其风险确定化所导致的
财政成本。①  
 


















































































































国 GDP 的 50%，泰国是 30%，而日本和韩国也都超过了 20%②。 
随着人们对政府债务风险认识的不断深入，特别是“财政风险矩阵（Fiscal Risk Matrix）”
                                                        




金融体系去支付中央政府所要求的国有企业的开销。 Eichenb-aum 和 Relelo（1998）认为应用“预期赤字（Prospective Deficit）”
来反映一国的财政平衡，他们以东亚国家为例，认为这些国家虽然在金融危机前保持预算盈余，但与此同时也有巨额的“预
期赤字”，如果这些“预期赤字”实现的话，意味着危机后会出现实际的巨额赤字。赤字概念的分歧反映了传统财政赤字度
量方法的缺陷与不足。见 Daniel, James A. and Jeffery M. Davis and Andrew M. Wolfe. 1997. “Fiscal Accounting of Bank Restru- 
cturing”, Working Paper. IMF. 
② Hana polackova Brixi and Ashoks Mody (2002). “Dealing with Government Fiscal Risk: An Overview.” In Hana Polackova Brixi 







































                                                        
① 本论文中，负债与债务的涵义相同，故或有负债与或有债务、直接负债与直接债务以及隐性负债与隐性债务都具有各自相
同的意思。其精确界定见本章下节内容。 
② IMF 编著、财政部财科所整理《财政透明度》，人民出版社 2001 年版，27－31 页。 
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